Deceptive judicial rhetoric does not refute explanations of behavior

Evidence

Dworkin is inferring judges’ attitude from the rhetoric ofjudicial opinions, and this is perilous, because judges are not always candid and also because they often are not self-aware. Even if judges are consistently and deliberately deceptive, this would not impair the soundness of the pragmatic explanation of judicial behavior. — Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 120

Categorization

• DEFINE: Posner distinguishing explanatory theory from the sincerity of actors’ self-reports — a method point about what counts as evidence.
• XREF: connects to: Judges make hidden factual assumptions that parties cannot challenge — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 397; Judges’ attitudes cannot be reliably inferred from opinion rhetoric — Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 120; Justifying a legal system differs fundamentally from causally explaining it through politics or psychology — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 181 (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• Justifying a legal system differs fundamentally from causally explaining it through politics or psychology #expands (0.80) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 181