Traditional doctrinal explanations may genuinely explain many judicial decisions.

Evidence

It is worthwhile repeating, however, that the empirical assessment that the Realists have urged may in fact turn out for some courts and some issues and some types of law to be less inconsistent with the traditional view of law than most of the early Realists imagined. It may well be, for example, that the principal determinant of judicial decisions on questions of statutory interpretation is the ordinary meaning of the words of the relevant statute, and that the chief determinant on questions of contract law in appellate cases is the traditional rules and principles and doctrines of contract law as found in conventional contracts casebooks and in treatises like Corbin and Williston. Such outcomes would have surprised the Realists, but such traditional legal explanations for judicial outcomes may well be sound for some or many domains, and the very fact of taking this to be an empirical question is, in the largest sense, perhaps the most important feature and legacy of the Realist program. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 259

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to how later chapters likely weigh formalist versus attitudinalist models of judging; also mirrors debates in other disciplines over whether expert-espoused theory matches actual behavior. — connects to: Judicial decisions are governed by beliefs about facts and rules — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 160; Justifying a legal system differs fundamentally from causally explaining it through politics or psychology — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 181; Judicial opinions typically provide legal support for decisions reached on nonlegal grounds — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 320 (+2 more)

Related

• Judicial opinions typically provide legal support for decisions reached on nonlegal grounds (similarity 0.87)
• The legal perspective holds law as the primary determinant of judicial decisions (similarity 0.84)
• Judicial decisions depend entirely on articulated reasons rather than fiat (similarity 0.81)
• Judicial decisions are governed by beliefs about facts and rules (similarity 0.81)
• Deceptive judicial rhetoric does not refute explanations of behavior (similarity 0.80)
• Judges make hidden factual assumptions that parties cannot challenge (similarity 0.80)
• Judicial opinions mask value judgments behind a surface of logical form. (similarity 0.79)
• Citations to nonlegal sources make judges’ empirical assumptions contestable (similarity 0.79)
• Judges rely on personal values when competing legal principles are evenly balanced (similarity 0.78)
• A complete account of judging combines legal rules with attitude-influenced discretion (similarity 0.78)
• Hidden value judgments, not logic, drive key judicial decisions (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Judicial opinions typically provide legal support for decisions reached on nonlegal grounds #complicates (0.70) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 320
• Judicial decisions are governed by beliefs about facts and rules #corroborates (0.65) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 160
• Justifying a legal system differs fundamentally from causally explaining it through politics or psychology #qualifies (0.50) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 181