De Gaulle’s peace offer meant truce, not capitulation, a distinction the F.L.N. missed.

Evidence

It was, according to his close associate, Bernard Tricot, the white flag of truce, not of capitulation, that de Gaulle had in mind—a subtle difference not appreciated by the F.L.N. any more than it had been by the Écho d’Alger. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 959 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

To lend additional enticement to this revelation of a promised land, de Gaulle began to accelerate the number of rebels amnestied. On Armistice Day, a thousand would be released; on New Year’s Day 1959, another 7,000; on de Gaulle’s accession to the presidency all capital sentences would be commuted (among whom Yacef was to be a notable beneficiary); while Bastille Day 1959 would be chosen, appropriately enough, for the release of a further 5,000. Then, at his Press conference of 23 October, de Gaulle threw out his memorable soldier’s offer of a paix des braves: … I say unequivocally that, as for most of them, the men of the insurrection have fought courageously. Let the peace of the brave come, and I am sure that all hatred will fade away and disappear. What does this mean? Simply this: wherever they are organised for combat, their leaders need only enter into contact with the French command. The old warrior’s procedure, long used when one wanted to silence the guns, was to wave the white flag of truce. And I answer that, in this case, the combatants would be received and treated honourably. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 940 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Here was de Gaulle the soldier, believing that he was addressing himself to enemy soldiers in the language of the soldier, and offering what he genuinely considered to be preliminaries to a “peace with honour”. But in fact he was addressing hardened politicians, and his phraseology betrayed the most complete failure to understand the psychology of the F.L.N. leaders. To them, however de Gaulle might construe it, the mention of the drapeau blanc des parlementaires could mean one thing and one thing only: capitulation. On the 25th the G.P.R.A. replied: “The declaration of General de Gaulle constitutes a refusal to negotiate….” In slamming the door as brusquely as they did, the G.P.R.A. were, from their point of view, absolutely right. For, with the shaky state of morale both among the civilians and A.L.N. units inside Algeria, had they accepted the paix des braves, even only as preliminary parley, the revolution might well have begun to flicker out and would have been extremely difficult to rekindle if the talks assumed a course unfavourable to the F.L.N. De Gaulle would have won the war; on the other hand, by rejecting the paix des braves the F.L.N. were, eventually, to win it. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 975 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: De Gaulle’s cease-fire overture was a truce flag, not a surrender — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 959; De Gaulle misjudged the F.L.N.’s political rather than military nature. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 946; De Gaulle’s soldier’s language misread F.L.N. psychology and ensured rejection of his peace offer. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 975 (+1 more)

Related

• De Gaulle offered amnesties and an honorable truce to the Algerian rebels in 1958. (similarity 0.92)
• De Gaulle’s mystical self-assurance blinded him to the F.L.N.’s political character. (similarity 0.91)
• De Gaulle’s soldier’s language misread F.L.N. psychology and ensured rejection of his peace offer. (similarity 0.91)
• De Gaulle’s cease-fire overture was a truce flag, not a surrender (similarity 0.89)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.88)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.87)
• De Gaulle misjudged the F.L.N.’s political rather than military nature. (similarity 0.86)
• Gaulle misread the F L N as a conventional insurgency open to compromise. (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle regarded the Evian settlement as an exit, not a victory. (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle paired Muslim representation guarantees with a peace offer to the FLN (similarity 0.83)
• The generals’ putsch forced de Gaulle toward genuine negotiation while weakening his hand (similarity 0.82)
• Recognition of the F.L.N.’s negotiating status blocked every peace initiative. (similarity 0.82)
• A surrendered A.L.N. commander publicly urged rebels to accept de Gaulle’s peace offer. (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle privately favored negotiating with the Algerian rebels as early as 1957 (similarity 0.81)
• F.L.N. deliberately sabotaged its own negotiating openings to deny de Gaulle international credit (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle’s cease-fire overture was a truce flag, not a surrender #corroborates (0.95) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 959
• De Gaulle offered amnesties and an honorable truce to the Algerian rebels in 1958. #corroborates (0.85) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 940
• De Gaulle’s soldier’s language misread F.L.N. psychology and ensured rejection of his peace offer. #expands (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 975
• De Gaulle misjudged the F.L.N.’s political rather than military nature. #complicates (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 946