De Gaulle regarded the Evian settlement as an exit, not a victory.

Evidence

It was, according to his close associate, Bernard Tricot, the white flag of truce, not of capitulation, that de Gaulle had in mind—a subtle difference not appreciated by the F.L.N. any more than it had been by the Écho d’Alger. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 959 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

In Algeria he had the pieds noirs at least temporarily under control. But as far as peace was concerned only disappointment could be recorded. His first attempt to obtain a cease-fire had been rejected with a crushing snub by the F.L.N. and the November elections had not led to the emergence of any tangible “third force” of interlocuteurs valables. Thus everything was at an impasse, and would remain so for the best part of the ensuing year. And, as well as that initial momentum, he had lost time that was irretrievable. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 957 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: De Gaulle privately viewed Evian as merely an honourable exit; Even the architects of the Evian accords felt no satisfaction in them; De Gaulle’s cease-fire overture was a truce flag, not a surrender — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 959 (+2 more)

Related

• De Gaulle’s cease-fire overture was a truce flag, not a surrender (similarity 0.94)
• De Gaulle privately viewed Evian as merely an honourable exit (similarity 0.88)
• Even the architects of the Evian accords felt no satisfaction in them (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s peace offer meant truce, not capitulation, a distinction the F.L.N. missed. (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s Algerian independence was framed as a victory over French self (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.83)
• France ending Algeria was a victory over itself, not a defeat (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s mystical self-assurance blinded him to the F.L.N.’s political character. (similarity 0.82)
• Algeria was only one element of de Gaulle’s larger ambitions. (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle’s pursuit of national grandeur required sacrificing Algeria. (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain a fundamentally contested riddle. (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle misjudged the F.L.N.’s political rather than military nature. (similarity 0.80)
• Porous frontiers shaped the Algerian War’s outcome and de Gaulle’s rise (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle’s cease-fire overture was a truce flag, not a surrender #corroborates (0.80) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 959
• France ending Algeria was a victory over itself, not a defeat #expands (0.70)
• De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress #complicates (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 957