de Gaulle’s backing of moderates collapsed as hard-liners took over the F.L.N.

Evidence

In a defensive statement Krim admitted that the previous month’s fighting had been “the hardest of the war”, and that the A.L.N. of the “interior” had suffered heavy losses. He then came under fierce attack for failing to supply it with arms and reinforcements, and was criticised for being, though an excellent commander in the field, no chief-of-staff. The fact that his attackers included those who previously had been his loyal supporters made Krim seem increasingly isolated. At the centre of the attack appeared Boussouf, described by Claude Paillat as become “the Fouché of the rebellion, but a revolutionary Fouché like Saint-Just, and provided with troops like Napoleon”. Behind Boussouf, and strongly backed by his powerful patron, stood the silent and reflective figure of Boumedienne; a new force to be reckoned with, he emerged as the focal point of what were henceforth to be recognised as the hard-liners, the guerre à outrance faction of the F.L.N. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1171 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Greatly exacerbated by the defeat in Algiers and the forced withdrawal of the C.C.E. from the city, internal rifts had brought the F.L.N. leadership to the brink of disaster by the spring of 1957. Once again the basic issue lay in the contention between the “interior” and the “exterior”; and, once again, the figure of Ramdane Abane was at the storm centre. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 698 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

If de Gaulle could have followed up the momentum of his first weeks with a concerted peace drive, or if the Challe offensive had begun in 1958 instead of 1959, the prospects would have looked incomparably bleak. But, as it happened, the long build-up to the referendum and the November legislative elections, followed by the run-down from the paix des braves olive-branch, had given the F.L.N. an invaluable respite in which to regain its breath. And when in 1959 the A.L.N. was confronted with the gravest military threat to its existence, it was already moving in—and under—a new direction. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 994 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The F.L.N. hard-line reshuffle doomed de Gaulle’s ‘association’ option; The G.P.R.A. reshuffle purged moderates and elevated Boumedienne’s faction; F.L.N. hardliners pushed tighter population control that moderates feared would ruin negotiation prospects. (+5 more)

Related

• The F.L.N. hard-line reshuffle doomed de Gaulle’s ‘association’ option (similarity 0.93)
• F.L.N. leadership regrouped in Tunis after losing Algiers to the French. (similarity 0.92)
• Challe offensive losses fueled a hardliner coup within F.L.N. leadership (similarity 0.91)
• F.L.N. hardliners pushed tighter population control that moderates feared would ruin negotiation prospects. (similarity 0.91)
• Post-independence leadership rivalries turned lethal within the F.L.N. (similarity 0.88)
• Defeat in Algiers pushed the F.L.N. leadership toward internal collapse. (similarity 0.88)
• Army hard-liners under Boumedienne challenged the F.L.N. political leadership (similarity 0.86)
• Boumedienne’s army challenge split the F.L.N. leadership into doctrinaire socialist and old-guard factions. (similarity 0.86)
• French offensives shattered the F.L.N.’s interior command-and-control network by 1959 (similarity 0.86)
• Army hard-liners like Boumedienne drove the F.L.N.’s negotiators to intransigence. (similarity 0.86)
• Interior-exterior rivalry among leaders threatened the F.L.N. as much as French pressure. (similarity 0.86)
• De Gaulle’s political delays gave the F.L.N. a vital respite before Challe (similarity 0.85)
• The G.P.R.A. reshuffle purged moderates and elevated Boumedienne’s faction (similarity 0.85)
• The Algerian negotiating camp was deeply split between Boumedienne’s hard-liners and Krim’s politicos. (similarity 0.85)
• Army chief-of-staff post shifted real F.L.N. power to Boumedienne’s hardliners (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• Challe offensive losses fueled a hardliner coup within F.L.N. leadership #corroborates (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1171
• Defeat in Algiers pushed the F.L.N. leadership toward internal collapse. #corroborates (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 698
• De Gaulle’s political delays gave the F.L.N. a vital respite before Challe #complicates (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 994
• French military pressure by 1958 drove A.L.N. morale collapse and mass defection #corroborates (0.40)