Citations to nonlegal sources make judges’ empirical assumptions contestable

Evidence

Citation to materials outside of the traditional legal canon may be for some a source of alarm, but it may as well be a way in which the empirical propositions that are necessarily a part of all judicial lawmaking and much judicial law application can be subject to argument and challenge, rather than simply being clothed in the disguise of common knowledge or what judges believe, not always correctly, and not necessarily unrelated to their own backgrounds, to be the common wisdom of humanity. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 398

Categorization

• XREF: Pairs with earlier chapters on stare decisis and rules — the transparency-vs-suboptimality tradeoff re-emerges for facts. — connects to: Judicial opinions typically provide legal support for decisions reached on nonlegal grounds — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 320; Judges make hidden factual assumptions that parties cannot challenge — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 397; Citation practice ultimately defines the boundaries of law itself — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 153

Related

• Judges make hidden factual assumptions that parties cannot challenge (similarity 0.87)
• Citation practice ultimately defines the boundaries of law itself (similarity 0.87)
• Judicial opinions typically provide legal support for decisions reached on nonlegal grounds (similarity 0.81)
• A legal citation implicitly legitimizes the entire class of source cited (similarity 0.80)
• Traditional doctrinal explanations may genuinely explain many judicial decisions. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Citation practice ultimately defines the boundaries of law itself #complicates (0.60) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 153