Citation practice ultimately defines the boundaries of law itself

Evidence

If seen as just a change in citation practice, this might be at best an interesting shift in the form of judicial opinions. But these changes do not merely reflect a transformation in citation practice. They embody a change in what counts as a legal source, and thus in what counts as a legal argument; and what counts as a legal argument-as opposed to a moral, religious, economic, or political one-is the principal component in determining just what law is. The boundaries of law are set by the boundaries of legal authority, and law speaks as law through its sources. When previously prohibited authorities become optional, and when previously optional authorities become mandatory, the nature of legal sources has changed, and with that change comes a transformation in the nature of law itself. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 153

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Citations to nonlegal sources make judges’ empirical assumptions contestable — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 398; A legal citation implicitly legitimizes the entire class of source cited — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 148; The scope and meaning of legal rules depend on factual similarities — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 151 (+2 more)

Broader Connections