Judicial opinions typically provide legal support for decisions reached on nonlegal grounds

Evidence

Once we understand judicial opinion-writing as the practice of offering legal support for decisions often involving elements other than the formal law-justice, for example, or efficiency, or wise policy, or even mercy or pity-we can see that many, maybe even most, judicial opinions are not fully candid. They read in the language of legal or rule-based motivation or compulsion, but their goal is to provide support or justification for decisions reached for different reasons. Perhaps it would be good if this were otherwise. Perhaps judicial opinions should describe accurately how the judge reached the decision she did. But as long as the idea of a judicial opinion as the accurate report of a decision-making process remains far more an aspiration than reality, the alleged importance of judicial candor turns out to be a substantial exaggeration. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 320

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the Legal Realism material summarized in Schauer’s own earlier chapter (Ch. 7), which this passage explicitly references. — connects to: Common law legitimacy derives from published judicial opinions and public reasoning. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 115; Judicial decisions are governed by beliefs about facts and rules — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 160; Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 496 (+8 more)

Related

• Traditional doctrinal explanations may genuinely explain many judicial decisions. (similarity 0.87)
• The legal perspective holds law as the primary determinant of judicial decisions (similarity 0.84)
• Judicial decisions are governed by beliefs about facts and rules (similarity 0.83)
• Judicial decisions depend entirely on articulated reasons rather than fiat (similarity 0.83)
• Common law legitimacy derives from published judicial opinions and public reasoning. (similarity 0.82)
• Legal expertise and persuasive opinions are a judge’s main influence tool (similarity 0.81)
• Judges make hidden factual assumptions that parties cannot challenge (similarity 0.81)
• Citations to nonlegal sources make judges’ empirical assumptions contestable (similarity 0.81)
• Judicial opinions mask value judgments behind a surface of logical form. (similarity 0.80)
• Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms. (similarity 0.80)
• Judges rely on personal values when competing legal principles are evenly balanced (similarity 0.79)
• Judicial discretion is constrained by written opinions and the craft of judging. (similarity 0.79)
• Logical reasoning provides the foundation that prevents common law from becoming arbitrary fiat. (similarity 0.79)
• Judges’ attitudes cannot be reliably inferred from opinion rhetoric (similarity 0.79)
• Hidden value judgments, not logic, drive key judicial decisions (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Judicial decisions depend entirely on articulated reasons rather than fiat #contradicts (0.70) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 138
• Common law legitimacy derives from published judicial opinions and public reasoning. #corroborates (0.60) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 115
• Judicial decisions are governed by beliefs about facts and rules #expands (0.55) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 160
• Sound legal arguments require both valid reasoning and true premises #corroborates (0.55) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 250
• Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms. #expands (0.50) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 496
• Citations to nonlegal sources make judges’ empirical assumptions contestable #expands (0.50) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 398
• Legal outcomes depend on variable choices and value judgments rather than absolutes. #qualifies (0.45) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 752