Challe’s military victory was illusory because guerrilla forces could regenerate.

Evidence

In summing up on the Challe Plan, though one may respect Challe’s sincerity in claiming that “the military phase of the rebellion is terminated”, one may well question just how fundamental and lasting were the consequences of this military victory; would they be decisive on the political conduct of the war; was it, on the other hand, going to prove a case of the operation succeeding and the patient succumbing nevertheless? As so often happens with the soldiers on the spot, there was a certain amount of self-deception by the “centurions” of Algeria, a self-deception that would shortly lead to the gravest of misjudgements. Even if Challe had effectively broken up the katibas into penny-packets of shaken guerrillas, so long as they were not all annihilated or won over there always existed the danger that at some future date they might reform themselves and recruit new replacements to fill the gaps. … What was not visible to the French military at the time should also be recalled; namely, that it was already the deliberate strategy of the new A.L.N. chief-of-staff, Boumedienne, to build up a powerful new force outside under the safe umbrella of Tunisian neutrality, at the expense of those hard-pressed katibas of the interior, but waiting for the right opportunity that would present itself one day. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1024 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Under pressure from the French army, he adopted a decisive new strategy: instead of attempting to back up the Wilayas at appalling cost across the Morice Line, the A.L.N. would be regrouped and reorganised inside the Tunisian sanctuary, and held there in readiness for future military and political opportunities. It was a strategy that would, to some extent, deceive the French Army Command into believing the military successes of the Challe Plan were greater than in fact they were—with consequences that will shortly be seen. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 993 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Challe’s military victories proved hollow because Boumedienne was rebuilding rebel strength abroad — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1024; French troops faced guerrilla warfare that negated their conventional military advantage.; The French army’s NATO-style force was ill-suited to counterinsurgency warfare. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 353 (+2 more)

Related

• Challe’s military victories proved hollow because Boumedienne was rebuilding rebel strength abroad (similarity 0.96)
• Challe’s countersurgency sought permanent occupation of rebel strongholds rather than one-off victories (similarity 0.93)
• Boumedienne’s regrouping strategy deceived French command about Challe’s success (similarity 0.92)
• Boumedienne’s retreat to Tunisian sanctuary deceived France about Challe Plan success (similarity 0.90)
• Wilaya 4 pioneered forms of revolutionary warfare that worried the French command (similarity 0.87)
• Challe’s focus on battlefield offensives blinded him to his colonels’ plotting (similarity 0.87)
• Pre-Challe French tactics wasted vast firepower while letting the A.L.N. slip away intact (similarity 0.87)
• French troops faced guerrilla warfare that negated their conventional military advantage. (similarity 0.86)
• The French army’s NATO-style force was ill-suited to counterinsurgency warfare. (similarity 0.85)
• Seventy-five uncoordinated sectors made French offensives ineffective (similarity 0.85)
• By 1960 French operations had destroyed most regular A.L.N. katibas inside Algeria (similarity 0.84)
• Agounennda exposed French limits despite a tactical victory (similarity 0.84)
• Guerrilla warfare made French suppression of the insurgency fail (similarity 0.83)
• Challe confined the coup to Algeria to keep fighting the ALN (similarity 0.83)
• Challe aimed to disrupt rather than annihilate the F.L.N. (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Challe’s military victories proved hollow because Boumedienne was rebuilding rebel strength abroad #corroborates (0.85) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1024
• Boumedienne’s regrouping strategy deceived French command about Challe’s success #expands (0.80) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 993
• French tactical victories could not win a prolonged elusive insurgency #corroborates (0.80)
• French troops faced guerrilla warfare that negated their conventional military advantage. #corroborates (0.70)
• The French army’s NATO-style force was ill-suited to counterinsurgency warfare. #expands (0.55) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 353