Both law’s traditionalists and its critics assume legitimacy requires determinate maxims

Evidence

“Traditionalists” maintain that this body of maxims is an authoritative repository of the objective wisdom of the culture and claim that counsellors properly trained in their craft are able to resolve problems entirely by resort to the body of maxims. … “Critics”-whom Winter refers to as adherents to “counselling lore semiotics” or “cls”-maintain that the system of contradictory proverbs cannot itself generate solutions and accordingly accuse Traditionalists of mystifying their profession in order to advance their claims to power and wealth. … “Wittgensteinians” also appear in the cast. They are summoned to point out that both Critics and Traditionalists assume that the legitimacy of — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 824

Categorization

• DEFINE: Sets up Winter’s three-way taxonomy of positions on legal indeterminacy (Traditionalists, Critics, Wittgensteinians), a reusable analytical frame.
• XREF: connects to: Legitimacy and justification are distinct concepts in constitutional theory. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 451

Related

• Legitimacy and justification are distinct concepts in constitutional theory. (similarity 0.81)
• Legal legitimacy is structural contingency, not shared conviction (similarity 0.81)
• Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation. (similarity 0.79)
• and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… (similarity 0.79)
• Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. (similarity 0.79)
• Every legal maxim has a counter-maxim applicable with equal plausibility (similarity 0.78)