Natural selection and rational foresight jointly produce group cohesion though proportions are unknown

Evidence

Pruitt and Kimmel (1976) examined the extensive literature on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and concluded that one important consideration for subjects is whether or not they view the interchange from a short-term or long-term perspective. In particular, if subjects believed that they would need to interact with each other after the study was concluded, and therefore the usual social and temporal isolation of such interactions was removed, their behaviour became considerably more cooperative. This result is, of course, consistent with many other findings and proposals from the economic and game-theoretic literature The second and third findings derive principally from the Trucking Game, which is due to Deutsch and Krauss (1960). — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 554 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Such is the nature of most natural selection. Populations adapt to surrounding conditions until they reach a local optimum. Environments may change and, when they do, selection kicks in once again favoring new trait sizes or colors that work better in the new surroundings. But these shifts also are expected to stabilize. Ocean sticklebacks have sported three long spines and fifty-two armor plates for hundreds of thousands of years. When some of these fish found themselves dumped into freshwater habitats, natural selection in their new environment led to a rapid shift from three spines to one, and from many armor plates to few (fourteen plates). But once these populations reached their new optimum, the change in armor stopped. — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 180 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Anticipated future interaction makes people substantially more cooperative — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 554; Natural selection stabilizes at local optima, as armor-plate shifts in sticklebacks show — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 180; Social competition environments evolve in tandem with weapons, unlike fluctuating physical environments — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 182 (+6 more)

Related

• Anticipated future interaction makes people substantially more cooperative (similarity 0.80)
• Social cohesion needs natural selection or rational foresight, not just function (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Anticipated future interaction makes people substantially more cooperative #corroborates (0.80) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 554
• Cooperation has no single solution; motivations combine and overdetermine action #complicates (0.78)
• Natural selection stabilizes at local optima, as armor-plate shifts in sticklebacks show #qualifies (0.75) — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 180
• Crowds arouse sub-individual instincts while organized groups transcend individuals #expands (0.75) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 345
• Social competition environments evolve in tandem with weapons, unlike fluctuating physical environments #qualifies (0.72) — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 182
• Cooperation might evolve spontaneously without anyone manipulating it #contradicts (0.72)
• Humans can intentionally choose trust rather than inherit it as a by-product of evolution #corroborates (0.72) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2821
• Cooperation-focused strategies fail where conditions for cooperation are themselves absent #contradicts (0.72)
• Cooperation unravels without iterated mutual knowledge of cooperative intentions. #qualifies (0.70)