Algeria’s war began in the same year France lost Indo-China

Evidence

The new leaders coming to Algeria had been profoundly affected by the disastrous lessons of the Indo-China campaign; particularly of Dien Bien Phu, after which a number had spent humiliating months as prisoners of the Viet-Minh. This experience had provided them with the opportunity to make an intimate study of the victors’ technique. They had returned well-versed in Maoist principles and strategy, as adapted by General Giap, and persuaded of the cogency of fighting revolutionary warfare with its own weapons. If the function of the guerrilla was to move like Mao’s “fish in water” among the uncommitted masses, then that must be the technique of the counter-revolutionary soldier too; if the Viet-Minh could bend the minds of the populace to their will and extract vital information by resort to subtle — or less subtle — forms of pressure, then so must the security forces. It was no use, says Colonel Roger Trinquier, one of the leading Indo-China hands, merely destroying dispersed armed bands; one had to seek out, crush and eradicate the whole of the clandestine political organisation behind them. If Indo-China had turned its French pupils into superb warriors, it had also made them highly political animals — a fact that was to have as potent an impact upon the French republic as it did on the Algerian war. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 504 (#expands, via linked claim)

With Ducournau the school of Indo-China arrived in Algeria. Setting up his headquarters in Arris, he immediately decided to pursue relentlessly the F.L.N. into the hills, living with the indigènes according to Mao’s often quoted principle of the “fish in water”, and taking with him as guides and trackers some of the loyal Chaouias that Jean Servier had recruited for the defence of Arris. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 328 (#expands, via linked claim)

In his novel The Centurions Jean Lartéguy relates how, on killing a fellagha leader, Si Lahcen, French paras found in his pockets a médaille militaire and a mention in despatches from Indo-China. “There’s something wrong about this war,” one para officer remarks to another. There was indeed. At night on 9 February 1956 a platoon of the 46th Tirailleurs stationed near Tlemcen was called out on an alarm — to be mown down by one of their own number, a caporal-chef, who wounded six soldiers before running off with the attackers. Worse followed ten days later when fifty men of the 50th Tirailleurs defected under another caporal-chef, a returned veteran from Indo-China, in similar circumstances. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 427 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Dien Bien Phu compounded 1940 in driving France to win in Algeria.; Viet-Minh counterinsurgency experience transferred directly from Indo-China to Algeria — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 328; Veteran Algerian soldiers from Indo-China defected en masse to the F.L.N. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 427 (+4 more)

Related

• Defeat in Indo-China turned French officers into practitioners of Maoist counter-revolutionary warfare (similarity 0.88)
• Indo-China defeat taught French officers to wage revolutionary war using Maoist methods. (similarity 0.87)
• Dien Bien Phu compounded 1940 in driving France to win in Algeria. (similarity 0.87)
• Indo-China counterinsurgency doctrine was transplanted directly to Algeria (similarity 0.85)
• Viet-Minh counterinsurgency experience transferred directly from Indo-China to Algeria (similarity 0.84)
• Dien Bien Phu’s fall shattered French military prestige and boosted Algerian recruitment (similarity 0.84)
• Dien Bien Phu humiliated the French army more than any postwar Western defeat (similarity 0.82)
• Veteran Algerian soldiers from Indo-China defected en masse to the F.L.N. (similarity 0.81)
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria (similarity 0.81)
• The French army’s 1940 humiliation fueled its determination not to lose Algeria. (similarity 0.81)
• Dien Bien Phu humiliated the French army as badly as 1940 did (similarity 0.81)
• The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956 (similarity 0.81)
• French counterinsurgency repeatedly traded military advantage for political costs (similarity 0.80)
• France’s counterinsurgency killed Algeria’s potential post-war leadership (similarity 0.80)
• The French army won militarily while losing the political and world battle (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Viet-Minh counterinsurgency experience transferred directly from Indo-China to Algeria #expands (0.55) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 328
• Defeat in Indo-China turned French officers into practitioners of Maoist counter-revolutionary warfare #expands (0.55) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 504
• Veteran Algerian soldiers from Indo-China defected en masse to the F.L.N. #expands (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 427