Literal disarmament of horrific weapons can increase instability rather than peace.
Evidence
This line of reasoning is not simply an enormous rationalization for an arms race. It does indeed suggest that “disarmament” in the literal sense, aimed indiscriminately at weapons of all kinds—or even selectively aimed at the most horrifying weapons of mass destruction—could produce instability rather than stability, and might have to be completely successful in order not to be disastrous. Nevertheless, there is an important area of arms limitations that is not only compatible with the foregoing analysis but is suggested by it. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 546
Categorization
- ADDENDUM: Connects to the sacrifice piece’s theme of institutional arrangements stabilizing order — here arms limitations enhance deterrence as a stabilizing institution rather than dismantling it.
- XREF: connects to: French disarmament backfired by provoking uprisings and troop defections. — Dubois, Laurent, Avengers of the New World_ The Story of…, 999; Cooperation may not suffice to arrest instability in the arms race. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 581; Weapons designed for first strike destabilize deterrence by inviting preemption. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 547
Related
- Cooperation may not suffice to arrest instability in the arms race. (similarity 0.80)
- A perfectly stable balance of deterrence may not even be desirable, let alone achievable. (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- French disarmament backfired by provoking uprisings and troop defections.
#exemplifies(0.95) — Dubois, Laurent, Avengers of the New World_ The Story of…, 999 - Weapons designed for first strike destabilize deterrence by inviting preemption.
#expands(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 547 - Cooperation may not suffice to arrest instability in the arms race.
#corroborates(0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 581