Yet, there is scarcely a page of Wittgenstein’s work, including his work on the foundations of mathematics, that is not devoted to an attempt to rescue our understanding of meaning by linking it to the ordinary practices of human beings using language; and the many striking examples of Wittgenstein’s imaginative anthropology are testimony to his commitment to the imaginative nature of rationality. Practice fetishism and particularism may indeed culminate in the denial that human beings can conserve and transmit shared experiences and in a related refusal to recognize the imaginative elements in human rationality. But because these very ideas-how human beings learn a language, how imagination plays a crucial part in that learning-are so much at the center of Wittgenstein’s work, it casts some doubt on whether Winter’s charges of fetishism, among others, are accurate.

Evidence

Winter heatedly denies that he ā€œbelieves that there must be ā€˜something standing between the Constitution and our understanding of it … I have argued, in contrast, that . . ā€˜the meaning of [the Court’s] constitutional interpretation is as much a matter of… our interpretive commitments, as it is a matter of the understanding of the Justices.’"" g And here one begins to see the problem: What exactly does Winter think this ā€œunderstandingā€ consists in? If it is a matter of interpretive commitments, objectified sedimentations, and the like, then is Winter’s outrage really justified? — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 366 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Some kinds of understanding cannot be transferred, only cultivated — , The Rod and the Child: A Global History…, 3945; Ethnophilosophers undermine their own thesis under Wittgenstein-Quine logic; Meaning arises from articulating linguistic systems rather than reflecting the world (+11 more)

Broader Connections