Risky challengers win bad-time votes despite equal expected value.

Evidence

It is important to distinguish this analysis of incumbency-oriented voting from the more common explanation that “when times are bad you throw the rascals out.” In the latter account, voters are thought to regard a credible challenger as having to be better than the incumbent, who “got us into this mess to begin with.” The present account, in contrast, is based on the notion that the challenger is riskier than the incumbent, not necessarily better overall. In problems 2 and 4, the risky candidates profit from hard times even though their expected value was no better than that of the relatively riskless candidates. Obviously, however, a challenger whose expected value is substantially below the incumbent’s is unlikely to be elected even in the presence of substantial risk seeking. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2441

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies the distinction between ‘throw the rascals out’ retrospective voting and genuine risk-seeking choice under loss-framed conditions.
• XREF: connects to: Incumbency-oriented voting results from risk asymmetry, not merely punishment. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology: Key Readings, 2440; Bad times make voters choose riskier challengers even with equal expected value; Loss aversion explains why incumbents win except during bad times. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2450 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Bad times make voters choose riskier challengers even with equal expected value #corroborates (0.98)
• Voters punish incumbents in bad times as risk seekers, not as rational appraisal #expands (0.82) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2441
• Incumbent advantage reflects voter risk aversion in gains while challengers benefit in losses #qualifies (0.80) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2406
• Loss aversion explains why incumbents win except during bad times. #expands (0.75) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2450
• Voter preferences respond to framing even when expected values are equal #expands (0.72)
• Voting may be irrational under expected-value calculus unless citizen’s duty supplies extra utility #complicates (0.72)