Rational choice assumes preferences stay stable across equivalent framings

Evidence

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of rational choice is the assumption of invariance. This assumption, which is rarely stated explicitly, requires that the preference order among prospects should not depend on how their outcomes and probabilities are described and thus that two alternative formulations of the same problem should yield the same choice. The responses to problems 7 and 8 above may be construed as a failure of invariance. In the present section, we present sharper tests of invariance in which the two versions of a given choice problem are unquestionably equivalent. Under these conditions, violations of invariance cannot be justified on normative grounds. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2461

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the invariance assumption cleanly and states when its violation cannot be normatively excused.
• XREF: connects to: Choice architecture steers decisions even when all options remain free — James D. Kirylo (ed.), Reinventing Pedagogy of the Oppressed:…, 530