Vicarious group responsibility for others’ suffering triggers shame or guilt.

Evidence

When individuals witness or learn about the suffering of other human beings, they may experience distress, and may, thus, be motivated to either prevent such distress from arising or to act to reduce it. This seems to be an uncontroversial view (e.g., Bandura, 1990). When the suffering is due to the actions of their own group, that is, when they hold vicarious responsibility for the event by virtue of their association with the perpetrating group, a different, more specific emotional pattern is likely to emerge: feelings of shame and/or guilt may be experienced. — Emanuele Castano, On the Perils of Glorifying the In-group, 63

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Establishes the distinction between general distress at suffering versus group-specific shame/guilt that frames the whole glorification argument.
  • XREF: connects to: Collective guilt requires group membership recognition plus perceived group responsibility for a humanitarian violation. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 791; Guilt can be felt for one’s group’s moral violations without personal responsibility — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 146; Collective guilt and collective shame are distinct reactions with different appraisal triggers — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 322 (+15 more)

Broader Connections