Trust enables action before another party’s cooperation is assured.

Evidence

Stenning et al. (1986) express this notion most evocatively: “Trust permits action to unfold in situations in which one party must act before they know that the other will play their part” (p. 5). Others make similar assertions: “trust as a gamble” (Luhmann 1979, p. 24); ”… prepayment made by him who trusts” (Luhmann 1979, p. 53); choosing to take an ambiguous path that can lead to a beneficial or harmful event (Deutsch 1962); ”… supplying benefits that create diffuse future obligations” (Blau 1968, p. 4). — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 20

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Competing definitions of trust: gamble, prepayment, ambiguous path, and diffuse obligation — a useful field-map of the concept.
  • XREF: The ‘prepayment’ and ‘gamble’ framings echo economic theorizing on transaction costs and the shadow of the future in repeated games. — connects to: Institutions enabling safe cooperation must precede trustworthiness, which precedes trust; Trust presupposes a structured environment supplied by the existence of other systems.; Cooperation requires at least one party’s essential action beyond the other’s control. (+4 more)

Broader Connections