Trust belongs to knowledge, so it cannot be offered, demanded, or withheld

Evidence

To say that something is moral could imply two quite different things: that it is morally required or that it is at least morally a good thing. If trust is a matter of knowledge, then moralizing it seems peculiar in either of these senses. Consider whether it could be required in common contexts. Is it moral or immoral to know or not to know, say, that Afghanistan is ruled by the Taliban? For certain officeholders in the U.S. Department of State it might seem immoral, or at least a failure of professional duty, not to know that it is. Am I immoral, however, if what I know about you is inadequate for me to trust you? Unless you can say, as one might of the State Department official, that I am in the wrong not to know those things about you that attest to your trustworthiness with respect to what is potentially at issue between us, then you cannot say it is morally incumbent on me to trust you. Similarly, to say that it is a virtue to trust is to say that it is a virtue to know that others are trustworthy. This is largely incoherent. It is surely a virtue in many contexts to act as one would if one did trust. It is the behavior or the inclination to such behavior, however, not knowledge, that is a virtue. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 373 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Trust as knowledge cannot be morally required — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 373; Trust cannot be demanded, only given freely like a present; Trust cannot be governed by clear-cut ethical instruction (+5 more)

Related

• Trust as knowledge cannot be morally required (similarity 0.95)
• Trust cannot be demanded but only offered through vulnerability (similarity 0.86)
• Trust grounded in false knowledge cannot be an intrinsic good (similarity 0.85)
• Trust reduces to knowledge while trustworthiness is motivational (similarity 0.84)
• Moralizing trust often stems from confusing it with trustworthiness (similarity 0.84)
• Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose (similarity 0.84)
• Trust is a kind of knowledge grounded in trustworthy evidence (similarity 0.84)
• Trust is a matter of knowledge and belief, not of choice or action. (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is a rational policy for conditions where knowledge is unavailable (similarity 0.82)
• Trust cannot be governed by clear-cut ethical instruction (similarity 0.82)
• Trust is willed action taken despite an information deficit. (similarity 0.82)
• Trust requires genuine vulnerability and the partner’s real interest in betraying it (similarity 0.82)
• Trustworthiness is interest-relative, not a fixed trait of character. (similarity 0.82)
• Virtue ethics and Kantianism can morally ground trustworthiness, but not trust itself (similarity 0.82)
• The literature mislabels trust as moral when really trustworthiness is moral (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Trust as knowledge cannot be morally required #expands (0.90) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 373
• Trusting is only knowledge; acting on trust is what carries risk #expands (0.85)
• Trust cannot be demanded, only given freely like a present #corroborates (0.80)
• Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose #expands (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 98
• Trust cannot be governed by clear-cut ethical instruction #expands (0.75)
• Trust cannot be demanded but only offered through vulnerability #contradicts (0.75)