The literature mislabels trust as moral when really trustworthiness is moral

Evidence

Much of the literature on trust treats it as an inherently moral matter, although often this is a misconception, because the actual arguments are that trustworthiness is a moral matter. Unfortunately, this is not a simple issue, in part because moral theory is very complex. In what follows, I simplify the issue substantially but without distortion by speaking of two large branches of moral theory whose focuses are radically different. A deontological branch focuses on rules for behavior—that is, on the nature of actions. A consequentialist branch focuses on the results of actions, not the nature of the actions themselves. In either case, if I believe you have strong moral compunctions to be reliable in some context, then I have strong reason to rely on you in that context. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 206

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes deontological (action-focused) from consequentialist (outcome-focused) moral grounds for trustworthiness.
• XREF: Echoes the Milgrom law-merchant reading: reliability substituted for moral character through institutional incentives, and the ‘trust is moral, trustworthiness is not’ split parallels trusting agency relationships.