The threat of publicity substitutes for formal judicial enforcement.

Evidence

Under New York law, binding arbitration awards can be confirmed in civil court. If this is done, the judgment has the same force and effect as an initial court award. In practice, however, it is rarely necessary for a party to a DDC arbitration to seek confirmation of a judgment. While arbitration awards are officially kept secret, a confirmation proceeding in court would quickly become public knowledge. Thus, the dealer against whom the judgment was entered would suffer severe damage to his reputation. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 107

Categorization

• XREF: Privacy is intra-community; publicity is the club’s cudgel — parallels how reputation operates in the dense Sicilian network where public knowledge of dishonor destroys standing. — connects to: Agenda confinement and publicity neutralize extortionate threats in negotiation — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 85; A private tribunal can enforce judgments through instantaneous reputational publicity. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 238; Public humiliation substitutes for weak legal enforcement of debts (+5 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: A genuinely counterintuitive inversion: confidentiality is the deterrent. The club keeps awards secret so that the only path to publication is the public court, making the very act of seeking formal enforcement the punishment.

Related

• A private tribunal can enforce judgments through instantaneous reputational publicity. (similarity 0.87)
• Arbitration judgments are enforced through public shaming and cross-bourse reciprocity. (similarity 0.80)
• Secrecy of arbitral disputes preserves a party’s creditworthiness and reputation. (similarity 0.79)
• Reputation enforcement works even without formal arbitration because traders seek future club membership. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• A private tribunal can enforce judgments through instantaneous reputational publicity. #exemplifies (0.92) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 238
• Public humiliation substitutes for weak legal enforcement of debts #exemplifies (0.90)
• Agenda confinement and publicity neutralize extortionate threats in negotiation #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 85
• Reputation substitutes for formal enforcement in private trading clubs #exemplifies (0.85) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 43
• Formal judges strengthen reputation systems rather than replace them. #complicates (0.80) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 14