The threat of ending an exchange is what enforces trustworthiness

Evidence

Hence the main incentive that one faces in a particular exchange in which one is trusted by the other is the potential benefit from continuing the series of interactions. The sanction each of us has against the other is to withdraw from further interaction. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 124

Categorization

Category: Causal Relationships

  • XREF: This is exactly Hardin’s assertion (per the reader’s stated purpose) that trust requires observable constraints — here the specific observable constraint is the sanction of withdrawing from future exchange.

Broader Connections

  • Trustworthiness enforced only by contract threats is not genuine trust #responds-to (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 251
  • Law substitutes for trust where trustworthiness fails against endgame incentives #exemplifies (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 328
  • Actual trustworthiness combines motives that resist institutional mimicry #contradicts (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 282
  • A utilitarian commitment to overall welfare generally implies trustworthiness in mutual exchanges #expands (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 224