Handshake contracts shift enforcement costs onto reputation bonds.

Evidence

It is not clear, however, a priori that these costs are necessarily higher than those incurred in the formation of an extralegal contract consummated with a handshake. Because the ability of the promisee to enforce an extralegal contract depends on the posting of a reputation bond — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 126

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Introduces the ‘reputation bond’ concept central to extralegal contracting.
  • XREF: connects to: A reputation bond equals forgone future profits from breach — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 168; Reputation can substitute for legal enforceability in evaluating contracts. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 213; Reputation-building is a deliberate investment of foregone gains (+4 more)

Broader Connections