The political moment must always prevail over the military in strategy

Evidence

Regroupment undeniably made life much more difficult for the A.L.N., but—as so often in the Algerian war—French policy found itself caught in the insoluble paradox of what was good militarily being bad politically, and vice versa. It was a pitfall into which, to some extent, the Americans were to stumble in South Vietnam. By the Battle of Algiers, Germaine Tillion concluded gloomily, “The implantation of the F.L.N. in the Algerian masses was too deep for any détente whatever to occur without the global agreement which it alone could give.” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 693 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Natural boundaries provide stable stopping points in military and political conflict — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 180; Military success on the battlefield coexisted with a sense that political betrayal was imminent.; French counterinsurgency repeatedly traded military advantage for political costs — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 693 (+4 more)

Related

• French counterinsurgency repeatedly traded military advantage for political costs (similarity 0.89)
• A militarily victorious counterinsurgency can still lose due to non-battlefield factors (similarity 0.87)
• Military success on the battlefield coexisted with a sense that political betrayal was imminent. (similarity 0.87)
• The French army won militarily while losing the political and world battle (similarity 0.85)
• Political struggle continues after military defeat on political terrain (similarity 0.84)
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria (similarity 0.83)
• The army’s ambiguous pacification strategy left it unsuited to counterinsurgency (similarity 0.83)
• The F.L.N. won the decisive political round just as the army defeated it militarily (similarity 0.82)
• The F.L.N. won its main war goal despite impending military defeat (similarity 0.82)
• The FLN won self-determination just when it faced military defeat (similarity 0.82)
• Agounennda exposed French limits despite a tactical victory (similarity 0.81)
• Military victory in the Battle of Algiers ultimately aided F.L.N. long-term goals. (similarity 0.80)
• Military victory elevated the army to ultimate political arbiter in Algeria (similarity 0.80)
• Soummam’s military doctrine produced the F.L.N.’s catastrophic Battle of Algiers (similarity 0.80)
• Algeria’s 1959 campaign rehearsed the Ludendorff pattern of battlefield success and strategic failure (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• The Soummam platform made political and interior forces supreme over military and exterior ones #exemplifies (0.95)
• French counterinsurgency repeatedly traded military advantage for political costs #exemplifies (0.92) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 693
• A militarily victorious counterinsurgency can still lose due to non-battlefield factors #corroborates (0.90)
• Military success on the battlefield coexisted with a sense that political betrayal was imminent. #complicates (0.78)
• Hegemony must be won before power is seized, not merely imposed by force after #qualifies (0.75)
• Natural boundaries provide stable stopping points in military and political conflict #qualifies (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 180