The Other’s existence is certain while the Other’s identity as this object never is.

Evidence

What appears to me then about which I can be mistaken is not the Other nor the real, concrete bond between the Other and Me; it is a this which can represent a man-as-object as well as not represent one. What is only probable is the distance and the real proximity of the Other; that is, his character as an object and his belonging to the world which I cause to be revealed are not doubtful inasmuch as I make an Other appear by my very upsurge. However this objectivity dissolves in the world as the result of the Other’s being “an Other somewhere in the world.” The Other-as-object is certain as an appearance correlative with the recovery of my subjectivity, but it is never certain that the Other is that object. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 768

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly sets up Beauvoir’s ethics — the certainty of the Other as subject grounds obligation even where specific knowledge fails. — connects to: The Other cannot be known as an object because objects are only ever probable — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 711; The Other’s necessity is contingent facticity, like the cogito’s indubitability — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 707; Certainty of the Other’s existence arises from the cogito itself, not from inference — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 710 (+6 more)
  • yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: The Other cannot be known as an object because objects are only ever probable — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 711; The Other’s necessity is contingent facticity, like the cogito’s indubitability — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 707; Certainty of the Other’s existence arises from the cogito itself, not from inference — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 710 (+6 more)

Broader Connections