The fame-judgment paradigm can be adapted to detect implicit gender stereotypes.

Evidence

Adapting the Jacoby et al. (1989) procedure, Banaji and Greenwald (in press) used equal numbers of male and female names (Jacoby et al., 1989, had used a large majority of male names) and varied the gender of nonfamous names by attaching a female or male first name to a common last name (e.g., Peter Walker or Susan Walker). Data from each subject’s judgments for each of the four within-subject conditions (old male, new male, old female, and new female) were reduced to a hit rate (proportion of famous names correctly judged famous) and a false-alarm rate (proportion of nonfamous names mistakenly judged famous). Signal-detection analysis (Green & Swets, 1966) permitted decomposition of the hit and false-alarm data into measures of sensitivity (d’) to the stimulus variable (name fame in this case), and threshold or criterion (0) for assigning the judgment. — Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition, 209

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Implicit measures are required to study nonconscious gender stereotypes — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 778; The representativeness heuristic can be repurposed as a covert measure of implicit group stereotypes — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 273; Automatic stereotypic associations operate preconsciously and independently of self-reported prejudice — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 298

Broader Connections