The attitude construct’s own history never barred unconscious operation

Evidence

The lack of mention of consciousness in this collection of attitude definitions accurately reflects a long scholarly tradition of nonconcern with the distinction between conscious and unconscious operation of attitudes. … At the same time, nothing in this scholarly tradition actively opposes either the possibility or the importance of unconscious operation of attitudes. — Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition, 69

Categorization

• XREF: Core to the reading purpose: the implicit/explicit divergence in bias measures is not a break from the tradition — the tradition simply never addressed consciousness, meaning unmeasured implicit attitudes were always possible within the construct’s own scope.
• DEEPTHINKING: Jarring realization: an entire field defined its central construct for seven decades without ever deciding whether it operates consciously, so implicit cognition isn’t an expansion of attitude theory so much as an acknowledgment of a gap always latent in it.