Moral value is assigned externally to actions, not intrinsic to them.

Evidence

Dr Servatius, Eichmann’s counsel in Jerusalem, pointedly summarized his line of defence: Eichmann committed acts for which one is decorated if one wins, and goes to the gallows if one loses. The obvious message of this statement – certainly one of the most poignant of the century not at all short of striking ideas – is trivial; might does make right. Yet there is also another message, not so evident, though no less cynical and much more alarming; Eichmann did nothing essentially different from things done by those on the side of the winners. Actions have no intrinsic moral value. Neither are they immanently immoral. Moral evaluation is something external to the action itself, decided by criteria other than those that guide and shape the action itself. — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 84

Categorization

• XREF: This external-therefore-linguistically-constructed view of moral evaluation resonates with the representation/Othering framework central to the later Islamophobia readings. — connects to: The moral difference between state violence and suicide bombing is not self-evident. — Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 153; Sympathy is not intrinsically moral because it serves partiality, not impartiality. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 660; Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356 (+5 more)

Related

• Individual moral judgment can remain intact without any supporting social rules (similarity 0.82)
• Means-ends reasoning excludes moral categories by structuring action technically rather than ethically. (similarity 0.81)
• Moral capacity arises socially but not from societal institutions (similarity 0.80)
• Morality precedes society and society merely manipulates an already-existing moral structure (similarity 0.80)
• Moral responsibility can compel insubordination to socially upheld principles (similarity 0.79)
• Morality operates only on known persons and fails on abstract categories (similarity 0.79)
• Rationality of the actor and of the action can diverge, making reason self-destructive. (similarity 0.78)
• Moral inhibitions do not act at a distance and depend on proximity (similarity 0.78)
• Social organization neutralizes morality by making action adiaphoric, neither good nor evil (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will #contradicts (0.90) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356
• Sympathy is not intrinsically moral because it serves partiality, not impartiality. #corroborates (0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 660
• Proximity grounds moral responsibility while abstract categories remain morally neutral. #corroborates (0.80) — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 526
• Moral rules cannot be created or altered by deliberate human enactment #corroborates (0.80) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 443
• Social organization neutralizes morality by making action adiaphoric, neither good nor evil #complicates (0.75) — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 613
• Morality precedes society and society merely manipulates an already-existing moral structure #complicates (0.75) — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 514