Social norms make people present stable identities that others can trust

Evidence

Trust placed in them has to rise up to the same level of reflexivity, otherwise it would experience continual disappointment. It is then no longer a matter of the other person remaining what he is, but rather of his continuing his self-presentation and of feeling himself bound by his past self-presentation. To the extent that this reflexivity becomes conscious, personal trust too becomes a variant of system trust. Only trust in the capacity for self-presentation to be reflected contains a guarantee for suitable continuity of behaviour under difficult, changing conditions. Only this form of trust regards the other person as truly free – and not merely as a being with certain constant characteristics. Only this form of trust can make itself conscious of the function of trust, the function of the reduction of complexity in the face of the freedom of the other person, and in this awareness find an orientation. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 239 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Trust stems from societal self-presentation conditions, not only individual strategies as Goffman holds.; Winning trust requires participating socially and absorbing others’ expectations into one’s self-presentation; Rigid, immovable persons earn trust only in a stable and uncomplicated environment (+27 more)

Related

• Trust stems from societal self-presentation conditions, not only individual strategies as Goffman holds. (similarity 0.94)
• Personal trust forms only where a personality is socially indispensable (similarity 0.90)
• Winning trust requires participating socially and absorbing others’ expectations into one’s self-presentation (similarity 0.89)
• Personal trust becomes a variant of system trust when it reflects on self-presentation (similarity 0.87)
• Trust in trust takes several structurally distinct forms (similarity 0.86)
• Trust is regulated through symbol-feedback loops, not direct reality contact (similarity 0.85)
• Self-presentation presumes minimum trust, and trust expands possible actions and accumulates as capital. (similarity 0.85)
• Modern societies increasingly substitute self-presentation for feeling as a basis of trust (similarity 0.84)
• Learning to trust is steered by the developing self-identity (similarity 0.83)
• Reflexive personal trust becomes trust in tact and disciplined self-presentation (similarity 0.83)
• Personal trust rests on expecting others to keep the personality they display (similarity 0.82)
• Trust requires interactive self-presentation, not mere predictable distance (similarity 0.81)
• Trust operates within already-reduced forms of an anonymously generated lifeworld (similarity 0.81)
• Primary emotional attachments ground trust that later extends far beyond them (similarity 0.80)
• System trust rests on trusting that others also trust (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Modern societies increasingly substitute self-presentation for feeling as a basis of trust #expands (0.65)
• Moral trust requires temporally stable social contexts to operate #corroborates (0.60)
• Personal trust becomes a variant of system trust when it reflects on self-presentation #expands (0.55) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 239
• Trust is regulated through symbol-feedback loops, not direct reality contact #complicates (0.45)
• Formal similarity of social position creates solidarity regardless of personal character #complicates (0.40) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 595