Personal trust becomes a variant of system trust when it reflects on self-presentation

Evidence

Trust placed in them has to rise up to the same level of reflexivity, otherwise it would experience continual disappointment. It is then no longer a matter of the other person remaining what he is, but rather of his continuing his self-presentation and of feeling himself bound by his past self-presentation. To the extent that this reflexivity becomes conscious, personal trust too becomes a variant of system trust. Only trust in the capacity for self-presentation to be reflected contains a guarantee for suitable continuity of behaviour under difficult, changing conditions. Only this form of trust regards the other person as truly free – and not merely as a being with certain constant characteristics. Only this form of trust can make itself conscious of the function of trust, the function of the reduction of complexity in the face of the freedom of the other person, and in this awareness find an orientation. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 239

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Precisely defines how ‘system trust’ subsumes personal trust once self-presentation becomes reflexive — the exact Luhmann-Giddens bridge the reader needs.
  • XREF: This is the direct theoretical counterpart to Giddens’s ‘faceless commitments’ — trust in expert systems rather than facework, and to Stevens’s career-long self-presentation as his only continuity. — connects to: Self-presentation presumes minimum trust, and trust expands possible actions and accumulates as capital.; Trust stems from societal self-presentation conditions, not only individual strategies as Goffman holds.; Personal trust forms only where a personality is socially indispensable (+15 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 239

Broader Connections