Primary emotional attachments ground trust that later extends far beyond them

Evidence

Trust is therefore an attitude which is neither objective nor subjective; nor can it be transferred to other objects or to other trusting people. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 155 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Admittedly, trust and distrust are, in the way in which complexity is reduced, confused in principle and oriented towards concrete persons or groups or the objects and events symbolizing their trustworthiness. That does not mean, however, that trust relationships cannot be restricted to specific aspects. One can trust someone in matters of love but not in money matters; one can trust his knowledge but not his skill, his moral intention but not his ability to report objectively, his taste but not his discretion. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 320 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Trust in others is developed in conjunction with the formation of an inner sense of trustworthiness, which provides a basis of a stable self-identity subsequently. Hence very early on trust implies a mutuality of experience. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 231 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Jointly negotiating trust is more mature than passive emotional reliance; Trust relationships can be restricted to specific domains of competence — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 320; A relationship of trust can shape one’s experiences with trauma. (+11 more)

Related

• Learning to trust is steered by the developing self-identity (similarity 0.88)
• Trusting others and trusting oneself develop together. (similarity 0.87)
• Trust is an attitude transferable to no other objects or people (similarity 0.87)
• Trust relationships can be restricted to specific domains of competence (similarity 0.86)
• Jointly negotiating trust is more mature than passive emotional reliance (similarity 0.86)
• Trust is not reducible to emotion the way joy might be (similarity 0.85)
• Trust requires genuine vulnerability and the partner’s real interest in betraying it (similarity 0.84)
• Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose (similarity 0.84)
• Personal trust forms only where a personality is socially indispensable (similarity 0.83)
• Winning trust requires participating socially and absorbing others’ expectations into one’s self-presentation (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is domain-specific, varying by context and relationship rather than globally. (similarity 0.83)
• Trust historically extended far beyond the narrow modern friend circle (similarity 0.83)
• Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is a degree of expected probability, not a separate decision layered onto risk. (similarity 0.83)
• Emotional grounding in one circle underwrites trust extended beyond that circle. (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Trust is an attitude transferable to no other objects or people #contradicts (0.70) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 155
• Trust relationships can be restricted to specific domains of competence #qualifies (0.60) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 320
• Learning to trust is steered by the developing self-identity #corroborates (0.50)
• Trusting others and trusting oneself develop together. #expands (0.50) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 231
• A relationship of trust can shape one’s experiences with trauma. #expands (0.45)