Sakiet’s fallout made the Algerian army feel betrayed by Paris.

Evidence

Back in 1958, at the time of confusion preceding de Gaulle’s takeover, Challe had seemed the embodiment of the ideal republican general, leaning if anything towards the Socialists. To his friend Guy Mollet he had remarked, “If this business goes on any longer, only de Gaulle will be capable of putting things back into order,” concluding emphatically: “For my part, I will never fire on my comrades in arms.” The series of disillusions that he had suffered as de Gaulle’s Commander-in-Chief in Algeria have already been amply traced; then had come the President’s “Algérie algérienne” speech of 4 November 1960, while Challe was commanding N.A.T.O.’s Central Europe theatre at Fontainebleau. Switching off the television, he confided to his diary: “From this moment I shall begin to think deeply about the sense of my remaining in the army.” Feeling increasingly a sense of futility at Fontainebleau, on 30 December Challe had offered his resignation. In giving his reasons to Debré, Challe had condemned the prospect of any Algerian government being formed by the G.P.R.A. — which was where he felt de Gaulle’s policy was leading. This would inevitably result in a “blood bath” and his conscience would not permit him to remain in the army. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1344 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Salan explained that, in his view—as well as that of “the entire population of Algeria”—only de Gaulle legitimately at the head of a government could save both Algeria and France. Pflimlin hung up. Salan had stepped firmly across the Rubicon; the army in Algeria was publicly committed; the bridges with metropolitan France were down. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 884 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

But, as indicated by the examples above, the fierce reprisal and the cruel, indiscriminate injustice did take place on the French side — as indeed they take place in every similar war. What is equally sure is that, as the S.A.S. captain pointed out to Alain Manévy, such acts usually militated against French interests in the long run. Looked at from the other side of the lines, this is confirmed by Herb Greer. Reporting a particularly brutal French reprisal in which women were killed, he quotes a member of the F.L.N. as declaring: “Voilà, we’ve won another battle. They hate the French a little more now. The stupid bastards are winning the war for us.” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 525 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria; Suez’s humiliating withdrawal devastated returning French troops’ morale in Algeria; F.L.N. propaganda undermined the loyalty of Algerian army units. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 427 (+8 more)

Related

• Challe’s loyalty to the republic collapsed only when de Gaulle shifted toward Algerian self-determination (similarity 0.87)
• Suez’s humiliating withdrawal devastated returning French troops’ morale in Algeria (similarity 0.84)
• The Algerian army command openly threatened to replace de Gaulle over self-determination. (similarity 0.84)
• The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956 (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle distrusted Si Salah’s renegades as turncoats against hierarchy. (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.83)
• Dissident colonels threatened to replace de Gaulle with Challe. (similarity 0.83)
• The army viewed any negotiated ceasefire as toppling its war effort in Algeria (similarity 0.83)
• France’s Algerian military dominance coexisted with its political weakness at home (similarity 0.82)
• Salan’s public de Gaulle declaration committed the Algerian army against Paris (similarity 0.82)
• de Gaulle’s backing of moderates collapsed as hard-liners took over the F.L.N. (similarity 0.82)
• F.L.N. propaganda triggered mutinies within veteran Algerian army units. (similarity 0.82)
• Challe’s focus on battlefield offensives blinded him to his colonels’ plotting (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s Algeria offensive aimed partly to distract the army from politics (similarity 0.82)
• Army officers saw the Algerian war as both career security and a noble cause. (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Challe’s loyalty to the republic collapsed only when de Gaulle shifted toward Algerian self-determination #corroborates (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1344
• Salan’s public de Gaulle declaration committed the Algerian army against Paris #exemplifies (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 884
• Brutal French reprisals backfired by deepening Algerian hatred of France #corroborates (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 525
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria #expands (0.45)
• The Algerian army command openly threatened to replace de Gaulle over self-determination. #exemplifies (0.45) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1104
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. #corroborates (0.40)
• Suez’s humiliating withdrawal devastated returning French troops’ morale in Algeria #corroborates (0.35)
• F.L.N. propaganda undermined the loyalty of Algerian army units. #complicates (0.30) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 427
• The F.L.N. physically extended its Algerian terror and fundraising methods to metropolitan France. #corroborates (0.30) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 743
• More soldiers cited French atrocities than war hardship as their worst Algerian experience #corroborates (0.30) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 732
• F.L.N. propaganda triggered mutinies within veteran Algerian army units. #complicates (0.30)