Dissident colonels threatened to replace de Gaulle with Challe.

Evidence

At Challe’s headquarters five generals and eleven field officers from General Crépin downwards told Debré flatly that the army would not fire on the barricades. It was Colonel Argoud who dotted the is by declaring that the only possible solution was for de Gaulle to renounce “self-determination”; otherwise he would be replaced by General Challe. Upon which, Debré expostulated to Delouvrier, “But you have a soviet of colonels here!” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1104 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Challe continues to insist that it was not his design to bring down the de Gaulle government, but merely “to change its policy”. Under no circumstances would he, the good republican, back anything that smacked of a fascist regime. This moderation, however, was certainly not shared by his fellow plotters, for the majority of whom Captain Sergent probably speaks: The absolute key to the whole business was de Gaulle — it was essential that de Gaulle should be removed….If I had known Challe’s thoughts, I would not have gone with him in April 1961…I fought to win the war — not like those generals who fought for the sake of their good consciences. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1355 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Back in 1958, at the time of confusion preceding de Gaulle’s takeover, Challe had seemed the embodiment of the ideal republican general, leaning if anything towards the Socialists. To his friend Guy Mollet he had remarked, “If this business goes on any longer, only de Gaulle will be capable of putting things back into order,” concluding emphatically: “For my part, I will never fire on my comrades in arms.” The series of disillusions that he had suffered as de Gaulle’s Commander-in-Chief in Algeria have already been amply traced; then had come the President’s “Algérie algérienne” speech of 4 November 1960, while Challe was commanding N.A.T.O.’s Central Europe theatre at Fontainebleau. Switching off the television, he confided to his diary: “From this moment I shall begin to think deeply about the sense of my remaining in the army.” Feeling increasingly a sense of futility at Fontainebleau, on 30 December Challe had offered his resignation. In giving his reasons to Debré, Challe had condemned the prospect of any Algerian government being formed by the G.P.R.A. — which was where he felt de Gaulle’s policy was leading. This would inevitably result in a “blood bath” and his conscience would not permit him to remain in the army. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1344 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Challe’s focus on battlefield offensives blinded him to his colonels’ plotting; The Algerian army command openly threatened to replace de Gaulle over self-determination. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1104; Challe aimed to change Gaullist policy, not remove de Gaulle — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1355 (+1 more)

Related

• The Algerian army command openly threatened to replace de Gaulle over self-determination. (similarity 0.94)
• Challe aimed to change Gaullist policy, not remove de Gaulle (similarity 0.92)
• Challe’s loyalty to the republic collapsed only when de Gaulle shifted toward Algerian self-determination (similarity 0.92)
• Challe’s focus on battlefield offensives blinded him to his colonels’ plotting (similarity 0.87)
• Algeria’s military ultimatum pressured a French president into inviting de Gaulle. (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle and Challe gave conflicting accounts of the self-determination private briefing. (similarity 0.84)
• Call of honour above pied-noir loyalty drove Challe’s doomed revolt (similarity 0.84)
• Junior officers saw Algerian independence immediately in de Gaulle’s self-determination speech (similarity 0.84)
• Massu publicly declared the army would not obey de Gaulle when still loyal (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle’s decolonisation rhetoric was the final trigger for Challe’s decision. (similarity 0.83)
• Sakiet’s fallout made the Algerian army feel betrayed by Paris. (similarity 0.83)
• Algeria’s top army commander publicly pledged to disobey de Gaulle (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle’s Algeria offensive aimed partly to distract the army from politics (similarity 0.83)
• Challe confined the coup to Algeria to keep fighting the ALN (similarity 0.82)
• Army officers saw the Algerian war as both career security and a noble cause. (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• The Algerian army command openly threatened to replace de Gaulle over self-determination. #corroborates (0.90) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1104
• Challe aimed to change Gaullist policy, not remove de Gaulle #contradicts (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1355
• Challe’s loyalty to the republic collapsed only when de Gaulle shifted toward Algerian self-determination #expands (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1344