Language requires general terms that cannot be explained purely by particulars
Evidence
The absolute minimum of what remains, even in the view of those most hostile to Plato, is this: that we cannot express ourselves in a language composed wholly of proper names, but must have also general words such as ‘man’, ‘dog’, ‘cat’; or, if not these, then relational words such as ‘similar’, ‘before’, and so on. Such words are not meaningless noises, and it is difficult to see how they can have meaning if the world consists entirely of particular things, such as are designated by proper names. — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 587
Categorization
- SEED: SEED
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 587
- XREF: connects to: Metaphysical distinctions between substances and universals stem from grammatical syntax. — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 732; Rules without concrete instances are meaningless hindrances — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 148; Language lacks a term for those who kill without risking their own lives — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 312 (+4 more)
Broader Connections
- Metaphysical distinctions between substances and universals stem from grammatical syntax.
#qualifies(0.40) — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 732