Plea bargaining persists even when caseload and evidence cannot explain it

Evidence

But if neither caseload pressures nor evidentiary problems fully account for plea bargaining, what does? Qnewiewus that’attorneys and judges engage in plea bargaining to enhance their discretion, so that they can seek what they perceive asysubstantivesjustice in each case. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1773

Categorization

• QUESTION: Text is OCR-garbled mid-sentence; flagged only because it signals the author is about to introduce an alternative explanation (discretion/substantive justice).
• XREF: connects to: Sustained investigation can harden rather than erode an advocate’s belief in their case — , Harr Jonathan - A Civil Action , 1446; Settling with one defendant can be worth less than the case it removes — , Harr Jonathan - A Civil Action , 1687; Trial’s availability as a fallback shapes settlement bargaining in civil cases — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2162 (+20 more)

Broader Connections

• Caseload pressures alone cannot explain plea bargaining rates #corroborates (1.00)
• Plea bargaining operates as a rough informal system of precedent #complicates (0.80) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1751
• No evidence shows plea bargaining is more corrupt than trial disposition #complicates (0.80) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1810
• Criticisms of plea bargaining often actually target features of the criminal justice system generally #complicates (0.70) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1810
• Racial disparity in plea bargaining is nearly unstudied despite its centrality #complicates (0.70) — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 619
• Prosecutors, not judges, dominate U.S. criminal outcomes via plea bargaining #complicates (0.70)
• Guilty pleas, not trials, now dominate criminal case disposition #complicates (0.70)