Rising caseloads without matching resources drove the spread of plea bargaining

Evidence

Plea bargaining is most commonly viewed as a response to os case pressures that afflict all those involved in the criminal courts.*? According to this view, which is endorsed by many judges and attorneys, escalating crime rates increased the number of cases coming to the courts, often without a corresponding increase in the resources available for dealing with them. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1765

Categorization

• QUESTION: This caseload explanation is contested — worth tracking what alternative accounts (institutional incentives, courtroom workgroup culture) the chapter weighs against it.
• XREF: connects to: Trial’s availability as a fallback shapes settlement bargaining in civil cases — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2162; Settlement and plea bargaining are priced by the anticipated trial outcome — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1256; Plea bargaining persists even when caseload and evidence cannot explain it — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1773 (+8 more)

Broader Connections

• Plea bargaining persists even when caseload and evidence cannot explain it #complicates (0.95) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1773
• Plea bargaining dominated criminal case processing long before modern caseload growth #contradicts (0.95) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1767
• Plea bargaining dominated American courts by the early 1900s, not recently #contradicts (0.95) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1767
• Caseload pressures alone cannot explain plea bargaining rates #complicates (0.90)
• Caseload volume does not determine how much courts rely on plea bargaining #contradicts (0.90) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1768
• Plea bargaining stems from institutional actors’ shared interest in speed, not caseloads #complicates (0.90) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1780