Regulatory agencies drift toward the interests of the firms they regulate

Evidence

The commissions almost always disappointed the hopes of farmers and small shippers. It was partly a problem of political leverage. Farmers and shippers were a large, diffuse group. The railroads were few and powerful. When farmers and shippers organized, and made a lot of noise, they got some results in the legislatures. But these campaigns depended on wobbly, transient coalitions. All the passion went toward passage of these laws. After enactment, passion died down. Commissions had to live with their railroads every day. They had to chastise them but not kill them. In practice, this meant that even commissions that were not corrupt tended to lean toward their railroads, and came to understand them. This habit, once acquired, was hard to break. On each daily decision, the railroad exerted its moral and economic pressures; farmers and shippers were unaware, unrepresented, apathetic. — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2588

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Regulated industries often capture their own regulators — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 583; Industry capture follows from regulators’ incentives and diffuse public interest — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 584; Regulatory agencies are captured by the industries they oversee — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 977 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• Regulatory agencies are captured by the industries they oversee #corroborates (1.00) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 977
• Regulators often protect the very corporations they are meant to regulate #corroborates (0.95) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 1550
• Anticipated lobbying careers make sitting regulators favor the industries they oversee #expands (0.82) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 1529
• Impending lobbying careers skew lawmakers and regulators toward the industries they oversee #expands (0.80)
• Regulatory agencies are captured by the industries they oversee through campaign contributions #expands (0.78) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 977
• Weakened regulatory oversight breeds fraud and exploitive management #expands (0.72)