Regulatory agencies are captured by the industries they oversee through campaign contributions

Evidence

Being recipients of campaign contributions and subject to other corporate pressures, legislative bodies and regulatory agencies are heavily influenced by the very industries they are supposed to oversee. In reality, the industry fears adverse publicity more than the threat of censorship. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 977

Categorization

• XREF: Classic regulatory capture argument, complementary to Milgrom’s analysis of institutional incentives in trade governance. — connects to: Regulated industries often capture their own regulators — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 583; Industry capture follows from regulators’ incentives and diffuse public interest — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 584; Regulatory agencies drift toward the interests of the firms they regulate — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2588