Anticipated lobbying careers make sitting regulators favor the industries they oversee

Evidence

Implementation is also thwarted by the “revolving-door” practice. Many lawmakers, regulators, and top staff members become high-paid lobbyists shortly after leaving government. A sizable number of lawmakers who preside over legislative policies affecting particular industries, as well as regulators who implement the laws, have an eye on a lucrative career change as lobbyists for the very industries they are overseeing. Under this conflict of interest they act on behalf of the industry instead of regulating it. Special interests are eager to recruit them because they know how Congress works Bandura_1e_ch05. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 1529

Categorization

• corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 1529
• XREF: connects to: Regulated industries often capture their own regulators — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 583; Industry capture follows from regulators’ incentives and diffuse public interest — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 584; Regulatory agencies drift toward the interests of the firms they regulate — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2588 (+1 more)