A false belief that Gaullists would strike first drove rival conspirators to escalate.

Evidence

On the 11th, a Sunday, he printed in the Écho’s weekly sister, Dimanche Matin, an unequivocal call to de Gaulle to intervene, under the clarion headline PARLEZ, … PARLEZ VITE, MON GÉNÉRAL. Coming from such a long-standing Pétainist, the article had—in Sérigny’s own words—“the effect of a bomb in Algeria”. Delbecque and the Gaullists were delighted by this powerful acquisition to their cause, but the “Seven” were thrown into a turmoil. On the evening of the 12th a meeting was held in Dr Lefèvre’s villa. The Chergui, the wind from the desert that exacerbates passions and distorts reason, had been blowing for two days. Amid an atmosphere tense with febrile rumours, the pied noir leaders allowed themselves to be persuaded—wrongly—that Delbecque was all set to launch a coup in the name of de Gaulle the night following the morrow’s demonstrations, and before Pflimlin could be sworn in. Therefore the Gaullists had to be beaten to it. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 861

Categorization

• XREF: The misconception-driven escalation mirrors the spiral patterns Horne describes in earlier chapters of rival settler/army factions racing each other to act. — connects to: Ottoman strategy relied on false intelligence that Syrians would revolt against Ibrahim.; Publicly known reluctance to strike first paradoxically deters the enemy. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 525
• QUESTION: Why did a long-standing Pétainist like Sérigny ally with the Gaullist cause at this moment?

Broader Connections

• Ottoman strategy relied on false intelligence that Syrians would revolt against Ibrahim. #epitomizes (0.75)