Providers of protection require external constraints to avoid abusing customers

Evidence

Fulfillment is not always observable. If one sells his vote in a secret election, or a government agrees to recommend an act to its parliament, or an employee agrees not to steal from inventory, or a teacher agrees to keep his political opinions out of class, or a country agrees to stimulate exports “as much as possible,” there is no reliable way to observe or measure compliance. The observable outcome is subject to a number of influences, only one of which is covered by the agreement. The bargain may therefore have to be expressed in terms of something observable, even though what is observable is not the intended object of the bargain. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 117 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Protection must include defense against rival extortionists; Institutional and legal constraints give people strong external incentives to be trustworthy; Bargains over unobservable compliance must be indexed to observable proxies — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 117

Related

• Bargains over unobservable compliance must be indexed to observable proxies (similarity 0.84)
• Protection must include defense against rival extortionists (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Institutional and legal constraints give people strong external incentives to be trustworthy #corroborates (0.82)
• Bargains over unobservable compliance must be indexed to observable proxies #qualifies (0.70) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 117