Private self-regulators can beat external regulators on knowledge and trust.

Evidence

Self-regulation has its defenders, too. Advocates point to the fact that private inspectors, unlike external regulators, are on site continually, “are more specialized and more knowledgeable about the risks generated by their company’s operation,” “are more likely to have the trust of the people they regulate and thus to have access to finer-grained and more relevant information,” and “can tailor protective standards more closely to the hazards presented by the particular enterprise” (Bardach and Kagan 1982, pp. 219, 272). — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 118

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to the ongoing expertise-vs-accountability tension familiar from classic sociology of professions (Freidson) and to contemporary debates about tech platform self-regulation. — connects to: Self-dealing spans conflicts of interest, exploitation of organizational resources, and insider trading. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 68; Private legal systems can rival state law when reputation functions as enforcement. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 16; Self-regulation protects against fringe abuses while shielding mainstream misconduct. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 115 (+4 more)
  • DEFINE: Names the concrete arguments that define what self-regulation claims to offer: granular knowledge, on-site presence, tailored standards.

Broader Connections