Self-regulation protects against fringe abuses while shielding mainstream misconduct.

Evidence

Critics charge that self-regulatory schemes may effectively protect principals against the most reprehensible misdeeds of trustees who are weak and marginal. But, under such arrangements, questionable activities that are standard professional practices or more serious abuses that are committed by mainstream practitioners may be ignored. Conflict of interest is intrinsically untrustworthy because it directly violates norms of disinterestedness. Self-regulation is a form of institutionalized conflict of interest; financial reporter Lee Berton (1986) proclaims the concept “oxymoronic.” — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 115

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reading purpose’s triad framework: self-regulation as a failed dyadic model that needs external guardians—echoing Shapiro’s concept and the Raskolnikov need for an institutional auditor. — connects to: Private self-regulators can beat external regulators on knowledge and trust. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 118; Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 1

Related

• Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse (similarity 0.81)
• Private self-regulators can beat external regulators on knowledge and trust. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse #complicates (0.75) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 1