Practices resist reduction to explicit rules because rules cannot be both explicit and comprehensive.
Evidence
A practice is a dynamic pattern of performance under varying circumstances. Consequently, it cannot be reduced to a set of rules because no such set could be both explicit enough to give adequate guidance and comprehensive enough to cover [new situations]… … On this view, there is little or nothing one can say about the content or structure of a practice, except perhaps to describe the stepby-step process of rote initiation. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 709
Categorization
- DEFINE: Defines practice as a dynamic pattern of performance, distinguishing it from rule-sets.
- XREF: Connects to Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox and the concept of tacit knowledge in Polanyi. — connects to: Rules without concrete instances are meaningless hindrances — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 148; Rules necessarily overreach their justifications because of their intrinsic generality — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 46; Reductionist legal theories obscure the diverse functions of rules within a social system — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 649 (+2 more)
Related
- Reductionist legal theories obscure the diverse functions of rules within a social system (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Rules without concrete instances are meaningless hindrances
#corroborates(0.72) — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 148 - Reductionist legal theories obscure the diverse functions of rules within a social system
#expands(0.60) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 649 - Rules necessarily overreach their justifications because of their intrinsic generality
#complicates(0.55) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 46