Obligatory rules grow fewer as their scope widens

Evidence

The rule includes or encompasses instances that the background justification behind the rule would not cover, as in the Kirby and Church of the Holy Trinity cases, as with the driver driving safely at 70, and as with an ambulance which might fall within the literal scope of the “no vehicles in the park” rule. In such cases the reach of a rule is broader than the reach of its background justification, and so we say that the rule is overinclusive. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 46 (#expands, via linked claim)

If we wish to break the hold of such norms as those that reinforce the exclusionary status of some group such as the aristocrats, a forceful way to do so would be to offer contrary incentives. That is what the modern industrial economy has inadvertently done to many aristocratic norms, such as the dueling norm (Hardin 1995, 91–100). Some of Vronsky’s class norms might, however, seem generally good, so that we might wish to keep them. Unfortunately, if they are merely universalistic norms, so that following them is not motivated by the exclusionary sanctions of the status group, they will most likely have far less force. No one other than the victims of violations will have incentive to sanction violations of them. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 271 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Personnel power thrives precisely where formal rules are weakest; Rules necessarily overreach their justifications because of their intrinsic generality — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 46; Practices resist reduction to explicit rules because rules cannot be both explicit and comprehensive. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 709 (+3 more)

Related

• Rules necessarily overreach their justifications because of their intrinsic generality (similarity 0.82)
• Universalistic norms lose force without status-group exclusionary sanctions behind them. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Rules necessarily overreach their justifications because of their intrinsic generality #expands (0.85) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 46
• Personnel power thrives precisely where formal rules are weakest #corroborates (0.80)
• Universalistic norms lose force without status-group exclusionary sanctions behind them. #corroborates (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 271
• Practices resist reduction to explicit rules because rules cannot be both explicit and comprehensive. #complicates (0.78) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 709