Participants in wrongdoing can suffer from knowing it is shameful

Evidence

Boesky seems to have achieved it by transforming the moral issue of inflicting harm into a lesser ethical violation of trader rules: “I think ‘immoral’ is probably the wrong word to use… . I prefer the word ‘unethical’” (Stewart, 1991). — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 1429 (#complicates, via linked claim)

The next day, however, I had to laugh at myself. I had reacted in precisely the same way in which participants in my studies do when information that threatens the image of the group to which they belong, particularly their moral status, is presented to them. Under these conditions, research has shown that we experience negative emotions such as guilt or shame, we feel outraged, we deny the very facts, or attempt to do so anyway, we re-conceptualize, we argue about labels, categories, and the meaning of the events, we try to put them in a different context, and we compare them with others and “worse” things that others have done (the others being, ideally, our very victims, or the group of whoever is presenting this information to us). I asked my girlfriend, “How dare you (an American) raise the issue of these teeny tiny camps when you have dropped atomic bombs over two cities?” — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2084 (#complicates, via linked claim)

With increasing allegations that he was a cheater, Armstrong consulted a dictionary: “So I looked up the definition of ‘cheat.’ And the definition of ‘cheat’ is ‘to gain an advantage on a rival or foe that they didn’t have.’” He concluded that he did not fit the description. “I didn’t view it that way; I viewed it as a level playing field.” He was equalizing the competitive baseline, he reasoned, rather than gaining a competitive edge. One has to cheat to win. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 240 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Public shaming campaigns may backfire by evoking shame instead of guilt — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 371; Forgiving perpetrators can feel like betraying the dead to survivors — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 1314; Free people dread witnessing collapse because of the stench of truth it would emit (+13 more)

Broader Connections

• Wrongdoers reframe immoral acts as mere rule violations to preserve self-regard #complicates (0.85) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 1429
• People threatened by their group’s moral failures deny, relabel, and relativize the facts #complicates (0.83) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2084
• People exploit narrow semantic definitions to reframe their wrongdoing as innocent #complicates (0.82) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 240
• Perceiving a group’s wrongdoing as situationally justifiable blocks collective guilt #complicates (0.80) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 297
• Contrasting worse inhumanities makes one’s own wrongdoing seem righteous #complicates (0.80)
• Shaming perpetrator groups over moral identity backfires by encouraging self-focus and backlash #complicates (0.80) — Nurit Shnabel and Johannes Ullrich, Identity Needs in Intergroup Relations, 156
• Perpetrators excuse harm by displacing blame and dehumanizing victims #complicates (0.80)
• Having documented facts can release people from shame attached to their group’s history. #complicates (0.76) — Nikole Hannah-Jones et al., The 1619 Project, 42
• Wrongdoers can actively damage accusers while believing their own innocence #complicates (0.75) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 238