Admitting group immorality is easier when it does not reflect on the group today
Evidence
Acknowledging immoral behavior by ingroup members may be easier when it does not strongly reļ¬ect on the ingroup today. An interesting question that can be raised is whether lower identiļ¬ers would acknowledge immoral behavior of ingroup members as easily when it reļ¬ects more strongly on the present ingroup, for example, when the immoral behavior continues to harm the disadvantaged group in the present? ā Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 1069
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Ongoing historical harms trigger defensive denial where ended ones allow acknowledgment ā Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: Internationalā¦, 1078; Mild group identifiers feel guilty when harm is distant and done by others ā Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: Internationalā¦, 1069; People excuse immorality from in-group members arbitrarily defined ā Lee McIntyre, Post-Truth, 102 (+4 more)
Broader Connections
- Highly identified group members minimize collective guilt by morally reinterpreting ingroup wrongs
#expands(0.80) ā , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature ofā¦, 2278 - Perceiving a groupās wrongdoing as situationally justifiable blocks collective guilt
#qualifies(0.80) ā Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 297 - People excuse immorality from in-group members arbitrarily defined
#qualifies(0.75) ā Lee McIntyre, Post-Truth, 102 - Framing attachment around ideals rather than current traits raises group-based guilt.
#corroborates(0.75) ā Sonia Roccas and Yechiel Klar and Ido Liviatan, The Paradox of Group-Based Guilt, 128