Ostracism, not state force, enforced medieval merchant law

Evidence

While the governments of towns supported the development of markets and were intimately involved in developing merchant law (Pirenne, 1925; Rorig, 1967), they often could not provide merchants protection outside their immediate area.* Nor could they enforce judgments against foreign merchants who had left town prior to a case being heard. Thus, merchant law developed prior to the rise of a geographically extensive nation-state. But this raises a key problem in the theory of enforcement, for what made these judgments credible if they were not backed up by the state? Ostracism played an important role here, for merchants that failed to abide by the decisions of the judges would not be merchants for long (Benson, 1989; DeRoover, 1963; Trakman, 1983). — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 31

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly parallels ‘On Sacrifice’ in exploring how pre-state social order was maintained; also echoes reputation-based enforcement in the Maghribi-trader economics literature. — connects to: Medieval merchants developed private commercial law without state enforcement — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 8; Medieval European commerce was governed by private merchant law, not state law — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 28; A Law Merchant institution can sustain honest trade as an equilibrium — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 95 (+4 more)
  • SEED: Article angle: social ostracism as the enforcement mechanism behind effective self-governing institutions — from medieval merchant law to modern professional guilds and online reputational markets.

Broader Connections