Community ostracism alone may be insufficient to enforce trade judgments
Evidence
In these circunistances the cheated merchant might be able to get a judgment against his supplier, but what good would it do if the supplier never returned to the Fairs? Perhaps ostracism by the other merchants might be an effective way to enforce the payment of judgments. However, if that is so, why was a legal system needed at all? — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 37
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the reader’s working model of private-order enforcement versus formal legal systems — complements Milgrom et al.’s private judge framework and Ostrom’s work on reputation-based sanctions. — connects to: Trade institutions must solve both an information and a punishment-motivation problem; Community boycotts can sustain cooperative trade as equilibrium without fixed trading partners. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 57; Ostracism, not state force, enforced medieval merchant law — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 31 (+1 more)
Related
- Ostracism, not state force, enforced medieval merchant law (similarity 0.85)
- Informal punishment fails because traders won’t boycott lucrative partners (similarity 0.80)
- Medieval merchant institutions existed to overcome the spatial limits of reputation mechanisms. (similarity 0.79)
- Medieval merchants developed private commercial law without state enforcement (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Trade institutions must solve both an information and a punishment-motivation problem
#expands(0.85) - Ostracism, not state force, enforced medieval merchant law
#contradicts(0.85) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 31 - Community boycotts can sustain cooperative trade as equilibrium without fixed trading partners.
#qualifies(0.80) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 57