Mutualism faces three challenges, all involving cost without visible return.

Evidence

For a long time, evolutionary theories of human cooperation were dominated by mutualistic theories (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Trivers 1971). In the last two decades, it has been argued that mutualistic approaches face several problems (Boyd & Richerson 2005; Fehr & Henrich 2003; Gintis et al. 2003). Three problems in particular have been highlighted: (1) Humans cooperate in anonymous contexts – even when their reputation is not at stake, (2) humans spontaneously help others – even when they have not been helped previously, and (3) humans punish others – even at a cost to themselves. In the following section, we show how a mutualistic theory of cooperation can accommodate these apparent problems. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 53

Categorization

• XREF: The three challenges map onto theories the reader likely has engaged: reputation-based indirect reciprocity, reciprocity with strangers, and altruistic punishment in Fehr & Gachter’s work. — connects to: Stable unconditional cooperation exists and mutualism alone cannot explain it. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 411; Mutualism pays off through average expected benefits, not guaranteed returns — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 79

Related

• Mutualism pays off through average expected benefits, not guaranteed returns (similarity 0.87)
• Stable unconditional cooperation exists and mutualism alone cannot explain it. (similarity 0.86)
• Mutualistic cost-benefit logic may explain transcendent moral sentiment. (similarity 0.82)
• Morality is about fair cooperation, not maximizing welfare. (similarity 0.81)
• Morality evolved as a propensity for fair cost-benefit sharing among cooperators. (similarity 0.81)
• Generalized reciprocity cannot be explained by partner-control mechanisms. (similarity 0.80)
• Reciprocal altruism is really mutualism, not altruism (similarity 0.80)
• Lifetime accounting makes apparent altruism actually mutualistic. (similarity 0.80)
• Mutual aid must remain equitable or helpers are judged as poor partners (similarity 0.79)
• The appearance of social contract arises from evolved mutualistic obligation, not real agreement. (similarity 0.79)
• Cooperation and morality are distinct categories. (similarity 0.79)
• Moral help extends only to where its cost stays below expected benefit. (similarity 0.79)
• Competitive altruism permits unconditional giving rather than matched reciprocity (similarity 0.79)
• Cooperative ventures are exchanges proportional to each partner’s contribution. (similarity 0.78)
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Mutualism pays off through average expected benefits, not guaranteed returns #qualifies (0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 79